Abstract
Introduction

13
The existence of real distortions in models with nominal rigidities -such as markup 14 shocks in the baseline new Keynesian model -imply that even if replicating the flexible price The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the basic model. Section 3 describes 1 the tax policy that would achieve the efficient equilibrium, and relates taxes and markups Intermediate goods are, in turn, purchased by retail firms who sell to households. The retail 10 goods market is characterized by monopolistic competition, and retail firms have sticky prices 11 that adjust according to a standard Calvo specification. where   is the probability of a worker finding a match and
is the fraction of searching workers. Thus, workers displaced at the start of period  have a 21 probability   of finding a new job within the period.
22
2 Hall (2005) has argued that the separation rate varies little over the business cycle, although part of the literature disputes this position (see Davis, Haltiwanger and Schuh, 1996) . For a model with endogenous separation and sticky prices, see Walsh (2003) .
If   is the number of new matches, then   =     . Let   denote the number of 1 job vacancies, and define   ≡     . Matches are taken to be a constant returns to scale 2 function of vacancies and workers available to be employed in production: across all members in equilibrium,   is the amount of work-hours supplied by each employed 13 worker, and   is the household's holdings of riskless nominal bonds with price equal to   .
14
The optimization problem of the household can be written in terms of the value function
17
where  () is increasing and concave (convex). Consumption consists of market goods 18 supplied by the retail sector plus home production:
productivity of workers in home production. The household faces the budget constraint
21
where   is the real hourly wage,   is hours,   is the price of a unit of the consumption   () from each  final-goods-producing retail firm so as to minimize total expenditure, given 7 that the production function of a unit of final good aggregate   is given by
Define   () = (     )  as the marginal product of a worker-hour. The value of a 10 filled job is
where   +1 is the future value of an unfilled vacancy With the probability of filling a vacancy 13 equal to   and the cost of posting it equal to , free entry implies that vacancies will be 14 posted until      =  and the value of a vacancy is equal to zero. Hence, Assume the wage is set by Nash bargaining with the worker's share of the joint surplus
. From (9) and (14), the joint surplus is
and the real wage bill consistent with the sharing rule for the match surplus is
The outcome of Nash bargaining over hours is equivalent to a setup where hours maximize 3 the joint surplus of the match. Thus, the optimal choice of hours satisfies
The left side of this expression is the after-tax real value of the marginal product of an 6 additional hour. The right side is the disutility of this additional hour relative to the marginal 7 utility of income. retail firm able to adjust its prices chooses   () to maximize and define ≡ (1 −   ). The retail firm's optimality condition can be written as
Market clearing implies    =   ∆  where ∆  is a measure of price dispersion defined as household's conditional expectation of lifetime utility under the constrained optimal policy.
12
The difference in welfare between the first and second best allocation is results, so in all our policy experiments   is set at the optimal level to offset the steady- measures the resulting welfare gain, which can be no larger than the search gap. To characterize the efficient equilibrium, the planner's problem maximizing household 10 utility is solved subject to the technology constraints. This problem is defined by
where the maximization is subject to
and the constraints in eqs. (2), (3), (7), (12) . The solution to the planner's problem requires 1 that the following four conditions be met:
Equations (31) itive equilibrium satisfies
9 while efficiency requires that (33) hold. Using (35) and (33) the tax on the intermediate
to close the vacancy posting wedge for any wage-setting mechanism. affects and potentially distorts these firms' choice of hours. To see this, note that (34) (17) implies this condition is replicated if and only if
Thus, unless also generates a wedge in the vacancy posting and in the hours choice first order conditions. 
Taxes and markups when the Hosios condition holds
10
One case in which price stability and a steady-state subsidy   are sufficient to achieve 11 the first best allocation occurs when wages are Nash-bargained and the Hosios condition
12
( = ) holds. In this case, the first best allocation requires the same tax policy as in the can be used to eliminate the wage from (36) to obtain
If  =  and (37) both hold, then (38) is satisfied for
for all . Thus, when the Hosios condition holds and the retail subsidy   ensures = 1, necessary to achieve the first best. When wage setting is inefficient and the Hosios condition does not hold, a cyclical tax 10 policy is generally necessary to achieve the first best allocation. In this case,
must deviate from one to ensure the efficiency condition (36) stability so that   =  *  implies from (17) that
This condition is inconsistent with (34), which must be satisfied to eliminate the hours improve labor market outcomes and will generally not close any of the wedges fully.
9
This trade-off arises because the markup   affects equilibrium through three separate 10 channels. First, it influences equilibrium hours in the intermediate sector through (17) . It is important to note, however, that while the policies in rows 3 and 4 close wedges, they do not imply that the first-best level of hours or vacancy is attained. That is, in row 3, for example, the choice of hours is optimal, conditional on employment, but because vacancy posting is inefficient, both employment and hours differ from their value in the first-best allocation. 10 With search frictions in the labor market, the 'divine coincidence' is the consequence of two simplifying assumptions: (1) the separation between retail and intermediate firms, so that pricing decisions do not affect directly vacancy posting and hours choice, and (2) the Nash bargaining mechanisn for setting hours.
on the objective of eliminating the vacancy posting wedge. Our basic calibration is presented in Table 2 and reflects standard choices in the literature.
Assume per-period utility is given by
and set the labor hours supply elasticity 1 equal to 2. The exogenous separation rate  
5
The first row of Table 3 shows outcomes under Nash bargaining when the Hosios condition 6 is satisfied ( =  = 05). In this case, only a steady-state subsidy equal to 1 −  and price 7 stability are needed to achieve the first best allocation under which both welfare gaps are 8 zero (see row 1 of Rows 3 and 4 of Table 3 provide evidence on the welfare effects of real wage rigidity.
19
Followng Hall (2005), a wage norm, fixed at an exogenously given value, is introduced.
20
Wages which adjust slowly but are incentive-compatible from the perspective of the negoti-
21
ating parties have frequently been adopted in recent research. 12 Focusing on the case of a
22
11 The fraction  is computed from the solution of the second order approximation to the model equilibrium around the deterministic steady state. We assume at time 0 the economy is at its deterministic steady state. wage that is completely insensitive to labor market conditions provides a useful if extreme 1 benchmark for assessing the welfare implications of sticky real wages. this wage norm, shown in row 3 of Table 3 , the cyclical behavior of labor market variables is 7 very different compared to the first best, but the loss attributed to the search gap amounts 8 to only 027% of the expected consumption stream (Table 3 , row 3, column 1). The optimal 9 policy leads to a small welfare gain of 005% relative to price stability.
10
The second case, shown in row 4, sets the wage norm equal to   (07), the steady-state 11 wage when  = 07  . The loss due to the search gap now rises to 162%. Optimal 12 monetary policy can increase welfare by 022% relative to price stability (row 4, column 2).
13
In absolute terms, this gain is non-negligible, yet it corresponds to only about one-seventh 14 of the search gap. (2010) find that, with a substantial degree of real wage rigidity, inflation stabilization can 1 yield a loss several times larger than the optimal policy. Since their measure is not scaled by 2 the steady-state level of utility, it is not directly comparable in terms of its implications for 3 welfare, and one cannot know whether the gain they find for deviations from price stability 4 translates into a large welfare gain in consumption units.
5
What is clear from Table 3 , and is a new result in the literature, is the finding that there is 6 little benefit from deviating from price stability even in the extreme case of a fixed real wage 7 if the wage is fixed at a level consistent with steady-state efficiency. However, large welfare 8 losses are incurred when wages are fixed at a level that is not consistent with steady-state 9 efficiency. In this case, the benefits of deviating from price stability are larger, but monetary 10 policy alone is ineffective in eliminating much of the welfare loss. to the subsidy   to retail firms).
23
With Nash-bargained wages and the Hosios condition holding, the efficient allocation is considers the case of Nash-bargained wages with  = 07  . Now, efficiency requires 2 firms post more vacancies in the steady state than they would in the market equilibrium. A 3 large steady-state subsidy, with   = −115%, is required to achieve the efficient allocation.
4
To understand the reason for such a high subsidy rate, note that as the subsidy to firms 5 increases, the total match surplus rises and so the wage also increases under Nash bargaining.
6
The rise in the wage dampens the impact of the subsidy on the surplus accruing to the firm 7 and on the incentive to post vacancies. For the firm to achieve the efficient surplus (equal to 8 1 −  times the surplus generated under the planner's allocation), the subsidy must be large 9 enough to compensate for the endogenous increase in wages.
10
As the last two columns of row 2 in Table 4 standard deviation increases by a factor of 20 and is nearly as volatile as output.
11
A wage set at a fixed norm results in a much larger volatility in employment, and these 14 This would also be the case qualitatively if the real wage were sticky as opposed to fixed. 15 In the case of inefficient Nash bargaining with    the optimal policy calls for a decrease in the tax LOCATE FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE. introduces a distortion in the choice of hours and generates an inefficient dispersion of prices.
8 Table 5 shows the consequences for welfare and inflation volatility of this policy. Row 9 1 of the table repeats the earlier result that with wages set by Nash bargaining and the
10
Hosios condition satisfied, price stability coincides with the optimal policy. 16 With wages 11 determined by Nash bargaining but  = 07  , row 2 of Table 4 showed that the optimal 17 This explains why previous papers that assume Nash bargaining find that price 4 stability is close to the optimal policy (i.e., Faia 2008, Ravenna and Walsh 2011).
5
Intuitively, the impact of a productivity shock with inefficient Nash bargaining is akin to Table 5 shows that maintaining   =  *  would yield 17 an additional welfare loss equal to 233% of consumption and lead to high inflation volatility.
18
When the wage norm is set at the inefficient steady state level   (07), implying a larger 19 share of the search gap being explained by inefficient cyclical fluctuations as opposed to the 20 steady state loss, row 4 of Table 5 shows that the efficient employment policy delivers a 21 substantial loss relative to the price-stability policy, amounting to 165%.
22
LOCATE FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.
23
To illustrate the trade-offs present in this case, figure 2 displays impulse responses fol-1 lowing a 1% productivity shock under a policy of price stability and under the efficient little bearing on the welfare outcome.
25
In summary, even with inefficient Nash bargaining there is little need for any cyclical policy to correct labor market inefficiencies, while with rigid wages the monetary policy 1 maker finds little incentive to correct for the search inefficiency by deviating from price 2 stability. This is so even though a tax policy could yield large welfare gains and a substantial 3 portion of the search gap arises from cyclical inefficiencies. In this section, a labor market characterized by a lower steady-state employment rate 6 and a larger share of available time devoted to leisure is considered. For this alternative 7 parameterization, it is also assumed that the separation rate is equal to about a third of the 8 one found in U.S. data. These assumptions imply a larger utility cost of hours worked, a lower 9 efficiency of the matching technology, and a cost of vacancy posting which is about twice a 10 large as in the U.S. parameterization. This parameterization, summarized in Table 6 , delivers 11 substantially smaller flows in and out of employment and longer average unemployment 12 duration, two regularities associated with the labor market dynamics of France, Germany,
13
Spain, and Italy over the last three decades.
14 Table 7 shows the welfare results for this alternative parameterization. The search gap is case, the welfare gain is also minimal in the case of a wage norm.
20
When the model is parameterized to deliver a longer unemployment duration, gross labor 21 flows are small, and the scope for monetary policy to correct inefficient search activity is 22 also reduced. Under our alternative parameterization, the quarterly job finding probability 23 drops from 76% to 25% , and the volatility of employment in response to productivity 24 shocks falls. As the volatility of hiring decreases, the welfare gain that could be achieved from a monetary policy that deviates from price stability to correct for inefficient vacancy 1 posting also decreases. Thus, the same labor market characteristics that lower steady-state 2 employment can make cyclical monetary policy less effective. In economies where labor 3 flows are more volatile, cyclical deviations from price stability can instead deliver meaningful 4 welfare improvement, and at least partially close the search gap.
5
Next, the performance of alternative policy instruments (steady state taxes and policies 6 directly affecting matching on the labor market) are examined once they are combined with 7 optimal monetary policy. Table 8 reports the cumulative impact of monetary, fiscal and 8 labor market policies under the two parameterizations, which are labeled U.S. and EU.
9
The cumulative welfare improvement relative to a price-stability policy for the case of an 10 inefficient wage norm is reported. The first row of 
Monetary policy (3) Price stability inefficient
Note: Efficient wage-setting requires Nash-bargained wages with a constant worker's pricing (respectively ∆  = 1 and eq. 21 evaluated at an equilibrium where   () 6 =   ).
7
A retail subsidy   = 1 −  such that = 1 is assumed in all cases.  The wage norm   (05) is equal to the wage level that delivers an efficient steady 
The results in the table are obtained assuming a complete set of policy instruments is 4 available to attain the first best allocation. give up to be as well off as in the alternative economy. Parameterization reported in Table A1 . 
